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Morris: The Importance of Promptly Presenting Checks for Payment

THE IMPORTANCE OF PROMPTLY PRESENTING
CHECKS FOR PAYMENT
WnIZAM 0. MoRMus

f

importance of the use of checks in the commercial world
may well be illustrated by comparison of the following statistics.
As of December 81, 1957, there was in circulation in United States
currency, outside of -the Treasury, $31,884,867,867,1 or $184.24 for
every man, woman, and child in the United States.2 As of the same
date, the total bank deposits in the 14,0883 banks in this country
totaled $283,680,000,000,4 of which $128,420,000,000 was represented by demand deposits. 5 As staggering as these sums appear,
the amount of outstanding currency at the end of 1957 was relatively
small when we consider that the debits to demand deposits, except
interbank and United States Government accounts, for 1957 was
$2,356,768,000,0006 representing debits for each of our estimated
160,000,000 population for the year of $14,729, or almost seventyfive times the sum of all outstanding currency. When it is observed
that many checks may well have passed through several transactions
before being paid by the drawee, the amount of the debts discharged
by checks would exceed an amount beyond the comprehension of
most persons.
Considering the number of checks written each year and amount
of money thereby represented, it is indeed the eighth wonder of the
world that the courts have not found it necessary to devote a greater
portion of their deliberation to the determination of controversies
over the respective liabilities of parties thereto involved. Perhaps,
the reasons for the relatively insignificant amount of litigation involving the liability of parties to checks may be attributed to the fact
that in the past several years there have been few bank failures, and
no little credit should be given to the drafters of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act for the clarity of the sections of the act applicable to checks. The scope of the following material will be limited
to the probing of problems relating to the time allowed a holder of
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a check in which to make presentment for payment in order to
establish the liability of the drawer and indorsers thereto.
Daniel in his work on Negotiable Instruments defines a cheek
as: "A draft or order upon a bank or banking house, purporting to be
drawn upon a deposit of funds, for the payment at all events of a
certain sum of money to a certain person therein named, or to his
order or bearer, and payable instantly on demand."7 A check is
similarly defined by section 185 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act 8 as: "... A bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on
demand." The act further provides "except as herein otherwise provided, the provisions of this chapter applicable to a bill of exchange
payable on demand apply to a cheek."
It is important in determining the rights of the respective parties
to point to the distinctions between an ordinary bill of exchange and
a check. By definition a check must be drawn upon a bank, 9 while a
bill of exchange need not have a bank as the named drawee. A
cheek need not be accepted as it only calls for payment upon timely
presentment.O The execution of a cheek contemplates that the
drawer has sufficient funds on deposit with the drawee to provide
for the payment of the check when it is presented for payment"
Unlike the drawer of a bill of exchange, the drawer of a check is
not relieved of liability by the failure of the holder to have made
timely presentment for payment but, as will be later discussed, the
drawer of a check is in such case relieved of liability to the amount
of damages that he may show that resulted from the unexcused
delay in making presentment of the check for payment. 12 A check
is not due until payment has been demanded, the statute of limitations would then only begin to run.
It is not at all uncommon for one to deliver his draft drawn upon
a bank to postdate the instrument. Is such an instrument, which we
commonly refer to as a postdated cheek, in reality a cheek or is it a
bill of exchange? Is such an instrument payable on demand when
the holder is required to refrain from presenting the document for
73 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTS 1791 (7th ed. 1933); for other but
similar definitions of a check see Rogers v. Durant, 140 U.S. 298 (1891);
Industrial 'Bank v. Bowes, 165 I1. 70, 75, 46 N.E. 10, 12 (1897).
8W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 16, § 2 (Michie 1955).
9Hawley v. Jette, 10 Ore. 31 (1881); Gifford v. Hardell, 88 Wis. 538,
60 N.W. 1064 (1894).
10
Minot v. Russ, 156 Mass. 458, 31 N.E. 489 (1892).
11
Gifford v. Hardell, 88 Wis. 538, 60 N.W. 1064 (1894).
12
UNjFORJ
NEGOTIABLE
TINsuimrs AcT § 186; W. VA. CODE ch. 46,
art. 16, § 3 (Michie 1955); Exchange Bank v. Sutton Bank, 78 Md. 577, 28 AUt.

563 (1894).
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payment until the date of the instrument? In Championv. Gordon,'3
Judge Sharwood said in answer to these questions: "It is not denied
that a post-dated check cannot be presented for acceptance. That is
by implication payable on a future date ....It is a check and not a

bill of exchange. More than twenty years ago banks of Philadelphia
under the advice of counsel adopted this rule, and it has been their
uniform practice ever since. The usage of the banks in the commercial metropolis of the state ought to have great weight in determining a question of this character. It is perhaps quite as important that
such usage should not be disturbed, as that the point should be
decided abstractly or theoretically right." Obviously a postdated
check, unlike a time bill of exchange, cannot be dishonored before
its actual date.1 4 In holding such instrument to be a demand instrument, presentment for payment need not be made on the exact date
of the postdated check as a condition to the establishment of the liabilities of the drawer and indorsers. Presentment within a reasonable
time after its date is sufficient to charge the drawer.' 5 The fact16that
the check is postdated does not affect its negotiable character.
Where, however, the instrument which purports to be a check
shows on its face that it was drawn on one date and to be due at
some subsequent designated date, the cases are in conflict whether
one is then dealing with a check or a bill of exchange. The better
reasoned cases have held such instruments to be bills of exchange,
as distinguished from checks. 17 These cases dealt with days of grace
which were formerly allowed on a bill of exchange, but which were
not permitted in the case of a check. As the days of grace have been
s
abolished by section 85 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act
these cases lose much of their significance. The determination as to
whether such an instrument be a check or a bill of exchange is still
important in determining whether the drawer is released of liability
as the result of the holder failing to make proper presentment thereof
13 70 Pa. 474, 476 (1872).
14 Wilson v. McEachem, 9 Ga. App. 584, 71 S.E. 946 (1911).
15 Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth, 296 Fed. 339 (4th Cir. 1924).
16 UNIFopm NEGOTIABLE INSThRuMENTs ACT § 12; W. VA. CODE ch. 46,
art. 1, § 12 (Michie 1955); Triphonoff v. Sweeney, 65 Ore. 299, 130 Pac. 979
(1918).
l In the case of Harrison v. Nicollet Nat. Bank, 41 Minn. 488, 43 N.W.
386 (1889), a draft for money drawn on a bank, payable at a day subsequent
to its date, and subsequent to the date of its issue, was held not to be a "check"
but a bill of exchange. While in Way v. Towle, 155 Mass. 374, 29 N.E. 506
(1898), an instrument in the form of a check which was dated August 31, 1899,
ordering bank to pay on October 1, 1899, was treated as a check and not as a
bill of exchange.
18W. VA. CoDE ch. 46, art. 6, § 16 (Michie 1955): "Every negotiable
instrument is payable at the time fixed therein without grace ...."
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for payment. In the absence of showing of due presentment for payment the drawer of a bill of exchange is released of liability, while
the drawer of a check would only be released to the amount of
damages suffered by reason of the delay in making a timely demand
of the drawee for payment.
In order for the holder to perfect his rights as a condition precedent to suit against the drawer or indorsers on a bill of exchange on
their secondary liability, it is necessary for the holder to allege and
prove that he had made proper presentment of the bill for acceptance or payment, or acceptance and payment, and to have had the
instrument dishonored by nonacceptance or nonpayment, followed
by timely notice of the dishonor. Otherwise the holder will be
denied the right to seek payment of the instrument from the drawer
or indorsers. 19
The failure of the holder of a check to establish that the check
was properly presented for payment and due notice of dishonor was
given will bar the holder from proceeding against the indorsers on
the basis of their secondary liability as set forth in section 66 of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act. 20 In comparison with the
liability of the drawer of a bill of exchange, other than a check, the
failure of the holder to prove that the check was timely presented
for payment will not discharge the drawer of the check completely
of liability, but will release him of liability only to the extent that
the drawer has incurred a loss by reason of such delay in presenting
the check to the drawee for payment. 21 If the drawer has suffered
no loss or damage by reason of the delay in making presentment for
payment, as where he had no funds on deposit with the drawee to
cover the check,22 or where the drawer had previously ordered the
bank to stop payment,23 he has no cause to complain of the holder's
19 Uzuron. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AcT §§ 61, 66, 79 73; W. VA.
ch. 46, art. 5, §§ 2, 7; ch. 46, art. 6, §§ 3, 4 (Michie 19551.
20W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 5, § 7 (Michie 1955). An indorser is discharged by unreasonable delay in presentation of a cheek though he suffered
no loss therefrom. Swift v. Miller, 62 Ind. App. 312, 113 N.E. 447 (1916);
Nuzum v. Sheppard, 87 W. Va. 243, 104 S.E. 487 (1920); Cominsky v. Kleiner,
34 Misc. 181, 68 N.Y. Supp. 776 (Sup. Ct. 1901). In an action by bank to
recover from indorser whom it had credited with the amount of the check and
had permitted to withdraw the money, the burden is on the bank to show a
presentation of the check to the drawee within a reasonable time. Knickerbocker
Trust Co. v. Miller, 149 App. Div. 685, 133 N.Y. Supp. 989 (Sup. Ct. 1912);
Millett
2 1 v. Miller, 185 Neb. 123, 280 N.W. 442 (1938).
Nuzum v. Sheppard, 87 W. Va. 243, 104 S.E. 587 (1920).
22
Giman v. F. 0. Bailey Carriage Co., 127 Me. 91, 141 AU. 321 (1928);
CODE:

Note, 24 MumH. L. REv. 498 (1925);

UNIFoRM NEGOTIABLE INsTRumENTs ACT
CODE ch. 46, art. 6, § 10 (Michie 1955).
Ur~o m NEGOTIABLE INsTmUMErrs AcT 79; W. VA. CODE ch. 46,

§ 79;23W. VA.

art. 6, § 10 (Michie 1955); Sabree v. Thomas, 166 IMI.App. 427 (1911);
Usher v. A. I. Tucker Co., 217 Mass. 441, 105 N.E. 360 (1914).
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delay in demanding payment from the drawee and his liability is
therefore not affected.
When the drawee bank has ceased to operate in the interval
between the time of issuance of the check and the date payment was
demanded from the bank, upon showing undue delay in making
presentation of the check for payment, and that the check would
have been paid by the drawee had it been timely presented, a
presumption arises that the drawer has suffered damages by reason
of the delay in making presentment for payment and casts on the
holder the burden of otherwise showing.2 4 For example, if the
check from A to B drawn upon C bank in the sum of $100 is held an
unreasonable time after issue before being presented for payment
and the bank had during this interval ceased to operate, and the
bank subsequently returns to the drawer only forty cents on each
dollar which was on deposit at the time the bank closed its doors,
the drawer has been damaged to the extent of sixty cents on each
dollar by the holder's failure to have timely presented it for payment The holder of the check is thus only entitled to recover $40
from the drawer, and must suffer the balance of the loss himself.
When the drawer is released of liability on the check under the
above facts, he is similarly released of liability on the underlying
debt. That is, if the creditor drawer is sued on the debt instead of as
drawer, he may plead payment of the underlying debt.2 5 As goes the
drawer's liability on the check, so goes his liability on the underlying debt.
In considering the period of time allowed the holder of a check
to make due presentment for payment in order to fix the drawer's
liability, see section 186 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act.
This section provides: "A check must be presented for payment
24

Watt v. Gans, 114 Ala. 264, 21 So. 1011 (1897); Stevens v. Park, 73 MII.
887 (1874). The presumption of loss arising out of want of diligence in
presentation of a check, and the intervening failure of the drawee, may be rebutted by proof that the drawer had no funds with the drawee to meet the
check,
25 or that he had withdrawn them before the bank failure.
In Kirkpatrick v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 119 Pa. 20, 12 At. 754, 755
(1888), Judge Sterrett said: "It is well settled that, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a check or promissory note, of either the debtor or a third
person, received for a debt, is merely conditional payment, that is, satisfaction

of the debt if and when paid; but that acceptance of such check or note implies
an undertaking of due diligence in presenting it for payment, etc., and if- the
party from whom it is received sustains loss by want of such diligence it will

be held to operate as actual payment." In cases where the creditor has given
his own check in payment of his indebtedness, the burden is upon the drawer

to show both delay and loss. Such holding puts the burden upon him, not only
to show delay in presentment, but loss to himself in consequence. Kahn v.
Walton, 46 Ohio St. 195, 20 N.E. 203 (1889).
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within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the
delay."26 This section by its language only applies to the liability
of the drawer and makes no reference to that of an indorser.
In the determination of what is a "reasonable" or an "unreasonable time" in which to present the check for payment, consideration
must be given to the nature of the instrument, any usage of trade
and business with respect to such instruments, and the facts of the
particular case. 27 As a check is not intended to be in circulation as a
substitute for money, a reasonable time in this situation will necessarily be a relatively short period. Ordinarily when the check is
drawn and is to be paid in the same town it should be presented to
the drawee for payment on the day of its receipt or the next business
day.28 'When, however, a check is received at a distant place it
must be forwarded by the next secular day by some recognized
method of transmission to some person or agency at the place of
payment, who has until the next secular day to make presentment
for payment.29 It has been held that failure to forward a check
for collection on the next business day is negligence where the
30
bank is in another place.
26W. VA. CODE
27

ch. 46, art. 16 § 3 (Michie 1955).

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dobin, 108 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. App. 1937).
Lowell Co-operative Bank v. Sheridan, 284 Mass. 594, 188 N.E. 636
(1934). Reasonable time for presentment of a check on drawee in same place
includes only banking hours of next business day after delivery. Maryland Title
Guarantee Co. v. Alter, 167 Md. 244, 173 AUt. 200 (1934).
29 Seager v. Dauphinee, 284 Mass. 96, 187 N.E. 94 (1933); Nuzum v.
87 W. Va. 243, 104 S.E. 587 (1920).
Sheppard,
30
Nuzum v. Sheppard, supra note 29. In Jett Bros. Stores v. McCullough,
188 Ark. 1108, 69 S.W.2d 863 (1934), the payee deposited check in home
town bank two days after receipt, but only one banking day having intervened,
the check being presented to the drawee in due course, held no unreasonable
delay.
Three days' delay in presenting check for payment held not unreasonable
where payee, a school teacher, had been engaged inteaching school on each of
those days. Peterson v. School District, 162 Minn. 347 203 N.W. 46 (1925).
Three days' delay in presentment of check for payment held unreasonable delay
where payee was cautioned by drawer that drawee bank was in precarious condition. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Keitch, 97 Okla. 55, 221 Pac. 1003 (1924).
Unexplained delay of four days in presenting check for payment held unreasonable. J. S. Martin Lumber Co. v. Rice, 133 Okla. 162, 276 Pac. 744 (1929).
One engaged in farming lived eight miles from town and received a check on
Tuesday, failed to present check for payment until Saturday, held not guilty of
unreasonable delay so as to lose his rights against drawer where the bank failed,
especially in view of the fact that the farmer had very little business training
and seldom went to town except on Saturday. Barry v. Harris, 186 Ark. 481,
54 S.W.2d 289 (1932).
Five days unreasonable delay. Seager v. Dauphinee, 284 Mass. 96, 187
N.E. 94 (1933); seven days' delay and thirteen days' delay in making presentment held unreasonable delay in Swift v. Miller, 62 Ind. App. 312, 113 N.E.
447 (1916), and Plainsville v. Rooks County, 137 Kan. 61, 19 P.2d 911 (1933),
respectively.
28
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Whether or not in a given undisputed factual situation due
diligence has been exercised in making presentment is a question
of law to be determined by the court.31 Where the facts are in
dispute and are capable of sustaining more than one conclusion,
the question of reasonableness is for the jury.32

As to Indorsers
Section 185 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act states:
"Except as herein otherwise provided, the provisions of this act
applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a
check."33 As the act does not otherwise distinguish the liability

of an indorser of a check from an indorser of a bill of exchange, it
must therefore be taken that the liability of an indorser on either
type of instrument will be the same.
One must examine section 66 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act8 4 to determine the liability of an unqualified indorser of
either a check or a bill of exchange. The last paragraph of this section fixes the conditional liability of an indorser by stating: "And,
in addition, he engages that on due presentment, it shall be accepted
or paid, or both, as the case may be, according to its tenor, and that
if it be dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be
duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any
subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it." In the case
of an indorser of a check we are only concerned with due presentment for payment; as a check may not be presented for acceptance
as might a time bill of exchange.
The real issue and problems relating to indorser's liability
springs from the unclear language of section 71 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act which states: ".. . Where it is payable

on demand, presentment must be made within a reasonable time
after its issue, except that in the case of a bill of exchange, presentment for payment will be sufficient if made within a reasonable time
after the last negotiation thereof." 35 The holder of a check is given

the same period of time in which to make presentment for payment
31
Krauss v. Aleek, 202 Iowa 91, 209 N.W. 444 (1926); Grant City First
National Bank v. Korn, 179 S.W. 721 (Mo. App. 1915); Nuzum v. Sheppard,
87 W. Va. 243, 104 S.E. 587 (1920). Contra, Citizens' Bank v. Pleasantville
First Nat Bank, 135 Iowa 605, 113 N.W. 481 (1907). The court stated that
it is not the universal rule that even if the facts are not in dispute the question
whether
the presentment was within a reasonable time is for the court.
32
Empire-Arizona Copper Co. v. Shaw, 20 Ariz. 471, 181 Pac. 464 (1919);
Slaymen v. Welch First National Bank, 104 W. Va. 265, 139 S.E. 750 (1927).
3W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 16, § 2 (Michie 1955).
34 W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 5, § 7 (Michie 1955).
35 W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 6, § 2 (Michie 1955).
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as the holder of a bill of exchange is allotted in which to make
presentment in order to establish the liability of the drawer or
indorsers thereon. The reasonable time for presentment in order to
fix the liability of an indorser of a bill of exchange or a check is
measured from the last negotiation, while the reasonable time in
the ease of the drawer of a check or bill of exchange is measured
from the issuance of the instrument The yardstick of time is the
same length in either of the cases, but the date from which the
measurement starts presents some most troublesome problems.
The question might be asked, can the liability of the indorser
on a check be preserved indefinitely, so long as each negotiation
follows promptly after each indorser acquired title to the instrument?
Mr. Britton in his work on Bills and Notes in partial answer to this
question stated: "[I] f an indorsee holds the instrument for such a
period of time that a negotiation by him would not be within a reasonable time after the last negotiation, it would seem that the liability of the antecedent secondary parties would be discharged as
to him. The question as to whether the liability of such parties
could be revived as regards an indorsee who acquired title after the
lapse of a reasonable time from the immediately preceding negotiation and as regards subsequent holders would turn on the question
whether such holders were holders in due course." 36
In referring to the last paragraph of section 66 of the Uniform
Negotiab[e Instruments Act,37 it will be noted that the secondary
liability of an indorser was said to extend to subsequent holders of
the instrument. Does the liability of the indorser really extend to
subsequent holders who are unable to qualify as holders in due
course? The first paragraph of the section dealing with the warranties of an indorser indicates that such liability of an indorser for
breach of warranty extends to subsequent holders in due course. It
was surely not the intention of the drafters of the act to limit the
liability of an indorser for breach of warranty to a holder in due
course and permit the indorser's conditional liability to extend to one
who is only a holder of the instrument It seems more logical and
desirable to hold that the term holder in due course as used in the
first portion of section 66 should be interpreted as to include holders
as well. This would extend the liability of an indorser on both the
warranties and conditional liabilities to the same persons. No logical reasons can be given for the difference in the language.
36 BRrrrON,
BrLs A Noms 867 (1943).
37W.VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 5, § 7 (Michie 1955).
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Quoting from section 58 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Act: "Where an instrument payable on demand is negotiated an unreasonable length of time after its issue, the holder is not deemed a
holder in due course." 38 It is suggested that close examination of
sections 53, 66, and 71 of the act will show that it is possible for one
who is unable to qualify as a holder in due course, (i.e., having acquired the instrument an unreasonable time after issue) to find that
he has nevertheless acquired the instrument within a reasonable time
after the last negotiation, and therefore be entitled to proceed against
prior indorsers on their conditional liability as set forth in section 66.
At least three important factual situations arise regarding the
time allowed a holder in which to make timely presentment of a
check or bill for payment in order to fix the indorser's liability thereon: first, where the check has been held an unreasonable length of
time by the holder before making presentment for payment; secondly, where the check has been outstanding an unreasonable period
before the first negotiation, the holder presents the check for payment within a reasonable time after acquiring the check; thirdly, the
bill or check indorsed and delivered by several successive indorsers,
the last of which was beyond a reasonable time after issue, the holder
making demand of the drawee for payment within a reasonable time
after its receipt.
In Columbian Baking Co. v. Brown,39 involving a draft sold by
a bank to defendant on June 10, indorsed and mailed to T on June
16, who received it on June 20, on July 14 sold it to plaintiff bank,
which in turn sent it to a Chicago bank which presented it for payment on July 18, it then being dishonored. In a suit by the plaintiff
bank against an indorser, recovery was allowed. The court stated "A
bill of exchange payable on demand, regardless of its character, put
in circulation, so long as its circulating character is preserved may
be outstanding without impairing the liability of indorsers thereon.
...

only the time need be considered intervening between the last

negotiation and the presentment." This language was clearly dicta
since the court found that under the facts of the case an unreasonable
time had not elapsed from the time of issue till time payment was
demanded and denied.
After considering the several sections of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act and the dicta in the Columbian Baking Co. case, the
following solutions to the three factual problems may be justified. As
88W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 4, § 3 (Michie 1955).
39 134 Wis. 218, 114 N.W. 451 (1908); Plover Savings Bank v. Moodie,
185 Iowa 685, 110 N.W. 29, 110 N.W. 476 (1907).
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to the first, where the check was held an unreasonable time by the
holder before making presentment, such holder would have the right
to look to the drawer for payment to the extent that the drawer had
not been damaged by the delay in demanding payment. As the
holder had failed to present the check within a reasonable time after
having received it, the holder would be denied the right to look to
prior indorsers for payment
In the second illustration, the check having been outstanding
more than a reasonable time after issue before the first negotiation,
we would not be concerned with a holder in due course being involved. Under the language of section 71 of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act and the dicta in the Columbian Banking Co. case,
any prior indorser could be reached on the basis of his conditional
liability, as the holder could show presentment for payment had
been made within a reasonable time after the last negotiation. The
holder would discover his rights against the drawer to be the
same as in the above problems. In the third situation, certainly
the last indorser should be held liable to the holder upon showing
that presentment for payment was made promptly after the holder
took the bill or check and followed with necessary proceedings of
dishonor. As to the holder's rights against prior indorsers, the answer is not nearly so simple. Does each indorser only agree to be
liable to a holder who makes presentment for payment promptly
after his negotiation? That is, may the indorser be relieved of liability by the passage of a reasonable time and then have his liability
revived by a new negotiation followed by immediate presentment for
payment and due notice of dishonor? It is suggested that in answer
to these questions it is possible for an indorser to find himself relieved
of liability by showing that the check or bill had been held an unreasonable time by some holder, but discover that his liability has been
revived by another negotiation followed by timely presentment and
necessary steps of dishonor.
Some of the confusion and uncertainty regarding the rights of
the holder in proceeding against indorsers on checks would be
simplified if we were to follow the suggestion of Mr. Norton in his
works on negotiable instruments when he said: "....

[I]t would

seem reasonable to construe section 71 of the act as laying down a
rule applicable only to the liability of the indorser who was a party
to the last negotiation, or as declaring the rule that presentment
must be made within a reasonable time after the negotiation of the
instrument by the person sought to be charged.... So construed, the

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol61/iss3/3
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statute declares the former rule of the law merchant as stated in the
English Bills of Exchange Act .... ,40

As the indorser's contract is separate and distinct from that of
any other persons to the instrument 4 l the indorser's obligation to pay
does not accrue until after due presentment, and necessary proceedings of dishonor have been duly taken, the statute of limitations as
to his liability would then only begin to run It is not necessary that
the holder exhaust his remedies against the drawer before proceeding against an indorser of a check.
Where the check of another is indorsed by the debtor in payment of his debt, the holder's failure to properly present such check
and demand payment promptly will release the debtor as to his liability as an indorser and likewise as to his liability on the original indebtedness for which the check was negotiated 42 irrespective of any
loss or damage to the indorser. 43 Inquiry as to whether the indorser
was or was not injured by the delay in failing to present the check for
payment is immaterial as his release is based on failure to properly
present the instrument and not on the basis of damages thereby
suffered. 44

40

NORToN, BiL.s AN NoTEs 500 n2 (4th ed. 1914).
41 Dougherty v. Shankland, 217 Iowa 951, 251 N.W. 73
42
Smith v. Miller, 43 N.Y. 171, 3 Am. Rep. 690 (1870).
43

(1933).

Smith v. Janes, 20 Wend. 192, 32 Am. Dec. 527 (N.Y. 1838). A check
was not presented for nine days after receipt by the plaintiff. The indorser was
held discharged irrespective of any question of loss. Proper presentment was a
condition precedent to indorser's liability, and his delay was not excused even
when the drawer was without funds on deposit, or because presentment would
have 44been unavailable as a means of procuring payment.
Comer v. Dufour, 95 Ga. 376, 22 S.E. 543 (1895).
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